Users of GPA-jamming devices tend to keep quiet about it. In recent years, evidence has mounted that Russia routinely interferes with or spoofs GPS signals, primarily to hide the exact location of key figures or military units. The development of such a device is easily within Russia's capabilities. In early 2019, the Civil Think Tank (C4ADS) released a report in which it described how it had found nearly 10,000 cases of someone (apparently Russia) jamming or spoofing satellite navigation signals. Not only US GPS, but also signals from non-US satellite navigation systems (Chinese Beidou, EU Galileo, Japanese QZAA and even Russian GLONASS). Most of this activity is not outright interference, but deception. This is apparently done to hide the true locations of key Russian officials (such as President Putin) and Russian military units. Identity theft is particularly common among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake ones, resulting in inaccurate smart bombs or planned attacks on targets. Identity is particularly prevalent among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake ones, resulting in inaccurate smart bombs or planned attacks on targets. Identity is particularly prevalent among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaces real satellite signals with fake ones, resulting in inaccurate smart bombs or planned attacks on targets.
Identity theft has become more popular and convenient because it does not require expensive or high-tech equipment. While U.S. military weapons and navigation systems are backed up in the form of rock-solid INS(Internal Navigation System) systems, these systems are useless if deception is not detected. Systems in the United States are supposed to detect spoofing and report it to INS, but the United States does not disclose details of how these systems work, making it difficult to modify the spoofing system to make it less detectable. This is one of the reasons why the United States has been slow to release information about imposter incidents. Further complicating matters are instances where AIS devices have reported that they have not received any GPS signals. Large ships usually carry two AIS units in case of failure. However, when using the Shanghai jammer, the AIS sometimes fails to receive a signal, resulting in an alarm sounding.
Other countries' complaints are less secretive, and the culprit is often Russia. In late 2018, Finland and Norway publicly accused Russia of deliberately jamming GPS signals in northern Finland and Norway at a site near a Russian military base on the Kola peninsula in the Barents Sea. The interference comes as NATO is holding its largest training exercise since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Russia has denied responsibility, although it is known to have remote jammers for GPS and other signals. Norway said it had located the signal jammers in a specific location, but when Russia refused to acknowledge any involvement, Norway refused
Curiously, the incident has had no impact on NATO military exercises, and even commercial airliners operating in the area have backup systems (INS) in case GPS signals do not work properly. Potential casualties are civilians flying in small aircraft or people on the ground who rely on commercial navigation equipment that uses GPS. Again, this may be the point, as Russian companies have long produced a wide variety of GPS jammers that are generally ineffective against military GPS users, but useful for criminals, terrorists, or anyone involved in unconventional warfare (as Russia has been in Ukraine since 2014). When it comes to undermining diplomatic relations with Norway and Finland, there is no need to remind these two countries what a bad neighbor Russia is and always has been. C4ADS concluded that impersonating Russian incidents is likely a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip, which could be a security measure aimed at using drones equipped with explosive devices to carry out assassinations. This has become a common tactic of Islamist terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes. C4ADS concluded that impersonating Russian incidents is likely a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip, which could be a security measure aimed at using drones equipped with explosive devices to carry out assassinations. This has become a common tactic of Islamist terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes. C4ADS concluded that impersonating Russian incidents is likely a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip, which could be a security measure aimed at using drones equipped with explosive devices to carry out assassinations. This has become a common tactic of Islamist terrorists, who see Putin as a prime target for drone strikes.
