GPS jammer in modern warfare
Modern warfare weapons, such as remote operated vehicles and drones, change advantages on terrain very quickly by collecting and delivering intelligence data to the operator in real-time. It is critical to block such attempts, and the only reliable way to do that is through a jamming device. Jamming devices is by far the most effective way to deal with such devices
It is not always required to spot the drone or remote operated vehicle to activate the jammer. You can do it as a preventive measure when entering unfamiliar terrain with possible drone treats. Disabling remote operated vehicles can be of crucial importance in such operations. Drones and such machines do not always have to be in motion, sometimes they are parked on a tree, building, or some other dominating or hidden spot that surveys the area. Preventive jammer activation is, probably, the smartest practice to implement in all future infantry actions.
Thus, low radar cross-sections and radar-absorbent materials will be a necessary, but not sufficient, feature of sixth-generation fighters. Some theorists argue that stealthy airframes may eventually be rendered obsolete by advanced sensor technology—and stealthy airframes can’t be upgraded as easily as avionics and weapons. Therefore, jamming, electronic warfare, and infrared obscuring defenses will also rise in importance.
Sensor fusion and optional-manning, however, imply that sixth generation jets will rely heavily on datalinks and networks which could be disrupted by jamming or even invaded through hacking. Ground-based logistics networks, such as the F-35’s ALIS, promise significant improvements in efficiency, but also expose even landed aircraft to potential cyberattack.
The jammer theory was indeed confirmed, but I never heard what happened to the driver. To be honest, I could see where that he was coming from. From their perspective, what our industry is doing to - clearly - improve the efficiency of the transportation industry is taking all the fun out of what they’re doing.
After about a year or so, the signals stopped. We assumed that some device created the jamming as a side-effect and that it was not intentional, but we really didn’t know. It was an intriguing ongoing ‘friday afternoon’ project for me and a couple of others. We drew lines on maps, trying to match the data to the Chinese embassy and things like that. Never got anywhere.
So yes, I have experienced GPS jamming. What I know is that it is really easy to do, and that, of course, has everything to do with the fact that these satellite signals are so incredibly weak. You just throw out electrostatic noise in that frequency band and almost any amount of power will do. You should be able to make something that runs on one AA battery that blocks the GPS for tens of meters around you if not more.
It is not always required to spot the drone or remote operated vehicle to activate the jammer. You can do it as a preventive measure when entering unfamiliar terrain with possible drone treats. Disabling remote operated vehicles can be of crucial importance in such operations. Drones and such machines do not always have to be in motion, sometimes they are parked on a tree, building, or some other dominating or hidden spot that surveys the area. Preventive jammer activation is, probably, the smartest practice to implement in all future infantry actions.
Thus, low radar cross-sections and radar-absorbent materials will be a necessary, but not sufficient, feature of sixth-generation fighters. Some theorists argue that stealthy airframes may eventually be rendered obsolete by advanced sensor technology—and stealthy airframes can’t be upgraded as easily as avionics and weapons. Therefore, jamming, electronic warfare, and infrared obscuring defenses will also rise in importance.
Sensor fusion and optional-manning, however, imply that sixth generation jets will rely heavily on datalinks and networks which could be disrupted by jamming or even invaded through hacking. Ground-based logistics networks, such as the F-35’s ALIS, promise significant improvements in efficiency, but also expose even landed aircraft to potential cyberattack.
Signal jamming - the effect of soft killing
It suddenly dawned on me what was likely going on: the driver probably didn’t like the idea of someone looking over his shoulder and had bought a cell phone jammer for sale. When he turned it on, his boss couldn’t see the vehicle, but it also meant that his satnav wasn’t working. So every time he needed to check where he was going he had to turn the jammer off. That produced a pattern of perfect data near the destinations, and a mess in between.The jammer theory was indeed confirmed, but I never heard what happened to the driver. To be honest, I could see where that he was coming from. From their perspective, what our industry is doing to - clearly - improve the efficiency of the transportation industry is taking all the fun out of what they’re doing.
After about a year or so, the signals stopped. We assumed that some device created the jamming as a side-effect and that it was not intentional, but we really didn’t know. It was an intriguing ongoing ‘friday afternoon’ project for me and a couple of others. We drew lines on maps, trying to match the data to the Chinese embassy and things like that. Never got anywhere.
So yes, I have experienced GPS jamming. What I know is that it is really easy to do, and that, of course, has everything to do with the fact that these satellite signals are so incredibly weak. You just throw out electrostatic noise in that frequency band and almost any amount of power will do. You should be able to make something that runs on one AA battery that blocks the GPS for tens of meters around you if not more.